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We examine the long-run impact of fiscal policy on economic growth under the conditions of an 
economic and monetary union (EMU). The analysis is based on the neoclassical growth model of 
a small (in economic terms) open economy in an EMU. The core assumptions are perfect capital 
mobility, which results in identical interest rates across the EMU, and perfect mobility of goods, 
which leads to the convergence of price levels. The model is based on standard neoclassical as-
sumptions, i.e., the output is determined by the Cobb-Douglas production function with a Harrod-
neutral technical progress and constant returns to scale, capital and labor receive their marginal 
products, etc. We show that a unique long-run equilibrium exists and is characterized by the so-
called natural rate of growth. The necessary and sufficient conditions of global asymptotic stability 
form a system of three non-trivial inequalities. We argue that in modern economies, these condi-
tions are satisfied, except perhaps for very short periods of time. Furthermore, we show that the 
golden rules of fiscal policy have the form of an alternative optimal policy that crucially depends 
on the relation between the real interest rate and the natural rate of growth and on the relations 
between five other autonomous parameters.
Introduction
We are investigating the influence of fiscal policy on 
growth performance in the long run. The analysis is 
based on the neoclassical growth model of a  small 
(in economic terms) country that participates in an 
economic and monetary union. Naturally, the model 
is inspired by the European Economic and Monetary 
Union. Nevertheless, the model rests on relatively 
general assumptions; hence, (perhaps after minor ad-
justment) it may well be applied to almost any small 
economic entity with independent fiscal authorities in 
any monetary union. Therefore, our conclusions have 
the value of universality: they can be applied not only 
to existing monetary unions but also to those that have 
ceased to exist or will be born in the future. 
The influence of fiscal policy on the long-run 
growth rate is the subject of many research papers, 
with the early contribution of Tobin (1965) to exog-
enous growth theory; there was another important 
paper by Barro (1990), who initiated a similar analy-
sis in endogenous growth theory. Important contri-
butions include Corsetti & Roubini (1996); Futagami, 
Morita and Shibate (1993); Ghosh and Roy (2004); 
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Greiner and Fincke (2009); Greiner and Semmler 
(2000); Groneck (2010); Minea and Villieu (2009). 
A review of the endogenous growth literature on fis-
cal policy is provided by Acemoglu (2008); Irmen and 
Kuehnel (2009).  
The vast majority of endogenous growth theory 
(including all the papers listed above) is based on 
models of a closed economy with no foreign trade, 
no international capital flows and zero foreign debt. 
In the XXIst century’s integrated world (especially in 
Europe), this model is an unacceptable oversimplifi-
cation. However, few researchers have made the ef-
fort to extend closed-economy models to incorporate 
some aspects of openness. Recent examples of endog-
enous approaches are Fisher (2010) and Turnovsky 
(2009) and the references therein. In the case of exog-
enous growth theory, Carlberg (1997) is most likely 
the most prominent example; he describes a general-
ized version of an open economy model with perfect 
mobility of capital. We present a modification of his 
model: by imposing small-economy assumptions and 
introducing both domestic and international bonds, 
we obtained some new conclusions.
We are building on our earlier paper Konopczyński 
(2004), where we presented the neoclassical growth 
model without an explicit public sector. Now, we will 
distinguish two separate sectors: private and public. 
Generally speaking, the first sector produces goods and 
services that are sold in the market, and the income 
(after taxation) is partially saved and invested. In con-
trast, the public sector collects taxes and finances public 
expenditures. The budget deficit is financed exclusively 
by bonds, which are sold indiscriminately to domestic 
and foreign investors. In addition, we introduce for-
eign bonds, which are issued by foreign governments. 
Most of our other assumptions are similar to those in 
Konopczyński (2004). We prove that the dynamic equi-
librium is unique and derive the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for its global asymptotic stability. In addition, 
we analyze the so-called golden rules regarding the fis-
cal parameters. 
A small economy in an EMU – basic 
assumptions
An economic union requires free movement of goods 
and services as well as all factors of production. In 
a  monetary union, all the member countries use 
a common currency, and furthermore, the monetary 
policy is conducted by a common central bank. We 
assume that the home country is small relative to the 
entire EMU. In particular, any changes in its economy 
are trivial from the EMU’s point of view, i.e., they have 
negligible influence on the union-wide level of prices, 
wage rates, interest rates, and etc. Furthermore, we 
treat an EMU as a closed economy. Henceforth, the 
terms “abroad” and “foreign” refer to “all other EMU 
member countries”.
The common currency facilitates the process of 
price convergence. For example, European Central 
Bank (2005); Sosvilla-Rivero and Gil-Pareja (2004); 
(2012); Wolszczak-Derlacz (2010) have found that 
differences in price levels in many sectors within the 
European Union are slowly decreasing. Therefore, we 
assume that in the long run, the equilibrium price 
levels are equal. The financial capital is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile. Consequently, the nominal interest 
rates are equal everywhere, and due to identical infla-
tion rates, the real interest rates are also uniform across 
an EMU. For a small economy, the real interest rate is 
exogenous:  * r r = . Due to perfect capital mobility, the 
supply of capital in a small economy instantaneously 
adjusts to the demand. Let K be the domestic capital 
(the stock of capital used for production within the 
given country). Obviously, a certain part of K is owned 
by foreign citizens. Let KN be the national capital, i.e., 
all the capital that is owned by citizens of the country. 
Then, a certain part of KN is allocated domestically, 
and the remainder is employed abroad. In addition, let 
E be the net foreign assets, so that  E K K    N + = . Lastly, 
we assume that the labor L is immobile because every 
country uses only its own stock of L. This assumption 
has strong empirical support. Researchers argue that 
in the case of the European Union, the mobility of 
people is low. Indeed, apart from obvious language and 
cultural differences, there are significant institutional 
barriers to migration within Europe (Kahanec, 2012; 
Meardi, 2012; Zimmermann, 2009).
The public sector (government)
By assumption, public revenues are proportional to 
the domestic output (which may be measured by the 
GDP):
Y T τ =    (1)Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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where  1 0 < <τ . If the public expenditures exceed the 
revenues, the difference is financed by bonds that are 
sold (indiscriminately) to domestic and international 
investors. For simplicity, we assume that the specific 
risk associated with lending money to all governments 
in the EMU is uniform. Hence, the real interest rate on 
public bonds in all EMU countries is equal to r. 
Let B stand for the total outstanding public debt. 
Then, the budget deficit, which takes into account the 
interest payments on the outstanding debt, is equal to 
T r  B G − + , where G represents all the government ex-
penditures. By assumption, all public expenditures are 
classified as consumption. We assume that the govern-
ment makes a decision on the specific value of the ratio 
of the public deficit to the domestic output (GDP), i.e., 
it decides on the value of the (non-negative) parameter 
ξ, which is defined as follows:
Y T r  B G / ) ( − + = ξ  (2)
A similar “fixed deficit” rule is used in some recent pa-
pers in the case of endogenous growth models of a closed 
economy, for example, Greiner, Semmler (2000), Gro-
neck (2010), and Minea, Villieu (2009). It follows that
Y r  B T G ξ + − =  (3)
Therefore, public expenditures are set according to the 
rule described by equation (3) with a crucial decision 
parameter ξ. The evolution of public debt is described by 
Y T r  B G B ξ = − + = ￿  (4)
A certain part of the new emission of bonds is pur-
chased by foreign investors (θ), and the rest is bought 
by domestic agents:
Y BF θ  ξ = ￿  (5)
Y BD ξ θ) 1 ( − = ￿  (6)
where  1 0 ≤ ≤θ . Of course, at every moment 
F D B B B + =  (7)
where  D B  is the domestic debt and  F B  is the foreign 
debt of the government. 
The national income account
The demand for domestic output consists of consump-
tion and investment of the private sector, public ex-
penditures and net exports, i.e.,
M X G I C Y − + + + =  (8)
The real national income consists of four elements:
•  the compensation of labor, i.e., w   L, where w is the 
average wage rate, which is equal to the marginal 
product of labor
•  the rent from the capital that is owned by citi-
zens (the national capital), i.e.,  K    N wK , where 
δ + = r wK  is the rental rate of capital and δ is the 
rate of depreciation,
•  the interest payments on domestic and foreign 
bonds, i.e.,  ) ( O B r D + , where O is the stock of 
foreign bonds held by the citizens of the country.
In the long-run state of equilibrium, the total rev-
enues of firms are equal to the compensation of labor 
and the domestic capital K, i.e., firms make zero eco-
nomic profits; for details see Konopczyński (2004), 
section 3. Hence, the real disposable national income 
(which is equivalent to the GNP) can be expressed 
as follows: 
) ( ) (
) (
) ( ) (
) (
O B r E r Y
O B r E w Y
O B r E K w w   L
O B r K   N w w   L Y
D
D K
D K
D K d
+ + + + =
+ + + ==
= + + + + =
+ + + ==
δ
 
   (9)
Therefore, the real disposable income is equal to the 
volume of the domestic output plus the revenues from 
the net foreign assets and the interest from domestic 
and foreign bonds. After taxation, this income is de-
voted to consumption C and savings S. If γ  stands for 
the average propensity to save, then
) ( T Y S d − =γ    (10)
) ( ) 1 ( T Y C d − − = γ , where   1 0 < ≤γ    (11)
Equations (8) – (11) imply that
) ( ) ( O B r E r M X G I C T S C D+ + + + − + + + = + + δ8 Michał Konopczyński
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Combining the above with (4) and (7) and rearranging 
yields the following well-known identity:
Q B I S + = − ￿ ,   (12)
where Q is the current account balance, i.e.,
F r  B r  O E r M X Q − + + + − = ) ( δ  (13)
Equation (12) is a very well-known macroeconomic 
identity: the excess of private savings over investment 
is used to finance both the public deficit and the cur-
rent account balance (Dornbusch, 1980, p. 23).
The dynamics of domestic capital (K) and national 
capital (KN) are described by standard rules:
K I K δ − = ￿    (14)
K   N I  N N K δ − = ￿    (15)
To keep things simple, we assume equal rates of depre-
ciation for all types of productive capital. Otherwise, 
we would have to explicitly describe the dynamics of 
each of the four types of capital (see above), which 
would seriously complicate the model. The net foreign 
assets are equal to the difference between the national 
capital and the domestic capital:  K K    N E − = . After 
taking into account (14) and (15), the evolution of E is 
described as follows: 
E I I  N E δ − − = ￿    (16)
By assumption, the national investment (which is fi-
nanced by the citizens of the country and augments 
the national capital) is proportional to the disposable 
income net of taxes, i.e.,
) ( T Y I  N d − =ψ ,   where    1 0 ≤ ≤ψ    (17)
The savings of the private sector add up to the fi-
nancial and real assets held by the citizens. There are 
three types of assets in the model that citizens can 
invest in: national capital (K    N), domestic bonds 
and foreign bonds. Hence, the usage of savings is de-
scribed as follows: 
O B I N S D ￿ ￿ + + =    (18)
Using (12) and (16), after rearranging we obtain
) ( E E Q B O F δ + − + = ￿ ￿ ￿    (19)
This equation gives important insight into the model: 
it implies that if the government borrows from abroad 
a certain amount of money ( F B ￿ ∆ ), then (if all the other 
conditions remain unchanged) the private sector will 
automatically lend the very same amount to these for-
eign governments (by purchasing  O ￿ ∆  foreign bonds). 
Accordingly, the domestic stock of money remains un-
changed. Therefore, any government decisions regard-
ing the proportion θ cannot influence the domestic 
absorption. The very same mechanism applies to the 
current account balance: if the current account balance 
increases (exogenously) by a certain amount of money, 
then (ceteris paribus) an identical amount of money 
will be invested in foreign bonds. Thus, neither the do-
mestic supply of money nor the aggregate demand for 
domestic output will change. 
The model
By summarizing all the above assumptions and using stan-
dard neoclassical technology (see Konopczynski (2004), 
section 4), we obtain the following system of equations:
[i]  δ α
α
− 




 =
−1
A   L
K
r  where  1 0 < <δ
[ii] 
β α ) (A   L K Y =  where  1 = + β α ,  0 , > β α
[iii]  Y T τ =  where   1 0 < <τ
[iv]  Y r  B T G ξ + − =  where  0 ≥ ξ
[v]  Y B ξ = ￿ ,  Y BF θ  ξ = ￿ ,  Y BD ξ θ) 1 ( − = ￿  where  1 0 ≤ ≤θ
[vi]  ) ( ) ( O B r E r Y Y D d + + + + = δ
[vii]  ) )  ( 1 ( T Y C d − − = γ  where  1 0 < ≤γ
[viii]  ) ( T Y S d − =γ
[ix]  M X G I C Y − + + + =
[x]  F r  B r  O E r M X Q − + + + − = ) ( δ
[xi]  ) ( T Y I N d − =ψ   where  1 0 ≤ ≤ψVizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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[xii]  K I K δ − = ￿
[xiii]  D B I N S O ￿ ￿ − − =
[xiv]  E I I N E δ − − = ￿
[xv]  A A σ = ￿  where  0 > σ
[xvi]  n  L L = ￿  where  0 > n
with the following initial (endowment) conditions:
0 ) 0 ( 0> =K K ,  0 ) 0 ( E E = ,  0 ) 0 ( 0≥ =B B ,  0 ) 0 ( 0≥ = F F B B , 
0 ) 0 ( 0 0 ≥ − = F D B B B ,  0 ) 0 ( O O = ,  0 ) 0 ( 0 > = A A , 
0 ) 0 ( 0 > = L L
It is convenient to rewrite the model by replacing the 
original variables with their ratios with respect to the 
effective labor AL. Hereafter, small letters indicate the 
original variables per effective labor (or pel, for short), 
e.g.,  A   L K k / = . For example, equation [i] can be re-
written as 
[i’]  δ α
α − =
−1 k r  
and equation [xii] as  
[xii’]  k i k ϕ − = ￿   
For simplicity, we assume that the real interest rate r 
and the depreciation rate δ are constants. Then, the 
stock of domestic capital pel is fixed, which can be in-
ferred from equation [i’]:
.
1
const
r
k = 





+
=
β
δ
α
   (20)
As a result, the domestic output pel is fixed as well. 
Because  0 = k ￿  at every moment, equation [xii’] im-
plies that the domestic investment pel is always pro-
portional to k:
k i ϕ = ,   where   δ σ ϕ + + = n    (21)
Consequently, the taxes pel are also constant over time. 
Hence, the model can be rewritten in the following 
very convenient recursive form (see Konopczyński 
(2004), section 4):
[k] 
β
δ
α
1






+
=
r
k  where  1 0 < <δ
[y] 
α k y =
[i]  k i ϕ =  where  δ σ ϕ + + = n
[t]  y t τ =
[g]  y r  b t g ξ + − =  where  0 ≥ ξ
[b]  b n y b ) ( σ ξ + − = ￿   
[bF]  F F b n y b ) ( σ θ   ξ + − = ￿  where  1 0 ≤ ≤θ
[bD]  D D b n y b ) ( ) 1 ( σ ξ θ + − − = ￿
[yd]  ) ( ) ( o b r e r y y D d + + + + = δ
[c]  ) )  ( 1 ( t y c d − − = γ  where  1 0 < ≤γ
[s]  ) ( t y s d − =γ
[x-m]  g i c y m x − − − = −
[q]  F r  b r  o e r m x q − + + + − = ) ( δ
[ik]  ) ( t y i n d − =ψ  where  1 0 ≤ ≤ψ
[o]  o n y i  n s o ) ( ) 1 ( σ ξ θ + − − − − = ￿
[e]  e i i  n e ϕ − − = ￿
[A]  A A σ = ￿  where  0 ) 0 ( e e = ,  0 ) 0 ( 0 ≥ =b b , 
0 ) 0 ( 0 ≥ = F F b b ,  0 ) 0 ( 0 0 ≥ − = F D b b b ,  0 ) 0 ( o o = , and 
0 ) 0 ( 0 > = A A .
The dynamics of the model and the 
(global) asymptotic stability of the 
steady state
In the basic version of the model (without government), 
the dynamics of the economy were described by a single 
linear differential equation (see eq. 30 in Konopczyński 
(2004), page 22). Explicitly introducing the government 
sector and foreign assets results in a significant compli-
cation of the dynamics, which is now described by a sys-
tem of four (still linear) differential equations:10 Michał Konopczyński
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) , , , (
) , , , (
) , , , (
) , , , (
4
3
2
1
e o b b f e
e o b b f o
e o b b f b
e o b b f b
D
D
D D
D
=
=
=
=
￿
￿
￿
￿
   (22)
where the first two functions are given in [b] and [bD]:
y b n e o b b f D ξ σ + + − = ) ( ) , , , (
1    (23)
y b n e o b b f D D ξ θ σ ) 1 ( ) ( ) , , , (
2 − + + − =    (24)
and  0 .> = const y . The function
3 f  can be obtained 
by substituting [s], [ik] and [yd] into equation [o]. Mi-
nor algebraic manipulation yields
[]
y t y
e r
o n r
r  b e o b b f D D
ξ θ ψ γ
δ ψ γ
σ ψ γ
ψ γ
) 1 ( ) )  ( (
) )  ( (
) ( ) (
) ( ) , , , ( 3
− − − − +
+ ⋅ + − +
⋅ + − − ++
− =+
     (25)
Obtaining the explicit form of the function 
4 f  re-
quires similar substitutions and manipulations that 
utilize the following equations: [e], [in], [yd], and [t]. 
Ultimately, we obtain
[] i y e r
r  o r  b e o b b f D D
− − + ⋅ − + +
++ =
) 1 ( ) (
) , , , (
4
τ ψ ϕ δ ψ
ψ ψ
   (26)
The dynamic equilibrium (or in other words, the 
steady state) is defined as the situation in which all the 
variables pel (except for A and w) are constant over 
time. Technically, in the steady state the right-hand 
sides of equations (22) are equal to zero.
Proposition 1. (the proof is in the Appendix)
The necessary and sufficient conditions of global as-
ymptotic stability are as follows:
[] []



 


− + + <
+ + − + − > + − −
− + > −
) 1 ( ) ( 2
) ( 2 ) 1 ( ) ( 3 ) ( 3 ) (
) )  (  ( ) (
ψ δ σ γ
σ ψ δ σ σ γ γ ψ δ
ϕ δ  ψ σ γ ϕ δ  ψ
n r
n n n r
n r   
   (27)
Because (27) is quite complicated, it does not allow for 
straightforward conclusions unless one moves to empiri-
cal research and calibrates the model with data. However, 
one interesting feature of the model is that the stability 
(or instability) is independent of all the fiscal parameters. 
Substituting various values of the parameters into (27) 
leads to the somewhat pessimistic conclusion that for 
some realistic calibrations the equilibrium is unstable, 
whereas for other realistic calibrations it is stable. Noth-
ing more conclusive can be derived from (27). However, 
from the economic point of view it is pointless to analyze 
unstable steady states. Whenever the economy is unstable 
(i.e., moving further away from the equilibrium), the de-
cision parameters of the private sector (ψ, γ) have to be 
adjusted. Otherwise, the economy breaks down. In this 
sense, it is pointless to analyze theoretical unstable steady 
states. Henceforth, we assume that the stability conditions 
(27) are satisfied, and in the next part of the paper, we 
only consider  stable equilibria. 
However, in the following section we will closely 
examine the stability conditions. In particular, we will 
try to assess whether these conditions are satisfied in 
the real world.
The equilibrium
Obviously, in the dynamic equilibrium (hereafter: the DE) 
all the variables pel are constants. Accordingly, all the origi-
nal variables (Y, K, C, I, and etc.) are growing exponentially 
at a constant rate that is equal to the natural rate of growth: 
σ + n  (except for L and A, which grow at the exogenous 
rates n and σ, respectively). In other words, all the variables 
expressed in units per capita ( L Y / ,  L C / , and etc.) are 
growing at a speed equal to the rate of technical progress 
σ. This rate also determines the speed of the growth of real 
wages (see Konopczyński (2004), section 6).
Before we examine the details, notice that four of 
the pel variables (domestic capital, output, domestic 
investment, and taxes) depend exclusively on the ex-
ogenous parameters and on the real (union-wide) in-
terest rate r. This result follows directly from equations 
[k], [y], [i], and [t]. Hence, the following equations are 
valid not only in equilibrium, but also elsewhere:
.
1
const
r
k = 





+
=
β
δ
α
   (28)
. const k y = =
α    (29)
. const k i = =ϕ    (30)
. const y t = =τ    (31)Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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Hereafter, bar symbols represent the values of vari-
ables in the dynamic equilibrium (the steady state). The 
equations [b], [bF], and [bD] lead directly to the steady 
state values of the public debt b , which is decomposed 
into the domestic debt  D b  and the foreign debt  F b :
σ
ξ
+
=
n
y
b ,     b bD ) 1 ( θ − = ,     b bF θ =  (32)
As a result, in the DE the public debt pel is proportion-
al to the level of government deficit (expressed as the 
ratio of the public deficit to the GDP ξ), and it is also 
inversely proportional to the natural rate of growth 
σ + n . Interestingly, b  is independent of τ, i.e., b  
does not depend on the size of the public sector. The 
index of indebtedness in the DE is equal to
σ
ξ
+
= =
n y
b
Y
B    (33)
The only decision parameter that influences the level 
of indebtedness in the DE is the government deficit 
parameter ξ. For illustration, suppose that the govern-
ment plans to keep the ratio of the public debt to the 
GDP at a constant level of 50%. According to (33), the 
deficit in relation to the GDP would have to be main-
tained at a stable level of one-half of the natural rate 
of growth. For example, if the long-run natural rate of 
growth  % 3 = +σ n , then the ratio of the public defi-
cit to the GDP has to be maintained at approximately 
1.5%. The obvious conclusion is that those countries 
that are characterized by high rates of growth (of pop-
ulation and technical progress) may safely allow them-
selves to have relatively high public sector deficits. In 
other words, the lower the rate of growth of the popu-
lation is, the lower the safe level of the government 
deficit is. However, if the speed of technical progress 
is very high, then even relatively high levels of public 
deficit do not endanger a country’s public finances. 
It follows from equations [g] and (32) that
B n B r G T ) ( σ + − = −    (34)
which means that in the DE, the primary budget sur-
plus is just enough to cover the interest on public debt 
adjusted by the factor  B n ) ( σ + . In other words, the 
ratio of the primary surplus to the public debt in the 
DE is equal to the difference between the real interest 
rate and the natural rate of growth.
To find the stationary values of other important 
variables, we need to solve the system of equations that 
will result if we set the right-hand sides of equations 
(25) and (26) equal to zero. Solving the resulting sys-
tem of equations yields the following values:
[ ]
D b
r n
e r t y
o −
− − +
+ + − −
=
) (
) ( ) (
ψ γ σ
δ ψ γ
   (35)
[]
y
n r r n
r n n
e r ⋅
− − + − +
− − + − + −
= +
) ( ) (
) ( ) )  ( 1 (
σ δ  ψ γ σ ϕ
ψ γ σ ϕ σ τ ψ
δ
α   
   (36)
Then, substituting these values into other equations 
yields
) ( ) ( o b r e r y y D d + + + + = δ    (37)
It follows from equation [c] that  ) )  ( 1 ( t y c d − − = γ . By 
taking into account formulas (32), (35) – (37) and re-
arranging the results in a strikingly simple formula for 
the DE consumption pel, we obtain that
y
n r r n
n
c ⋅
− − + − +
− + −
=
) ( ) (
) )  ( )  ( 1 (
σ δ  ψ γ σ ϕ
τ β σ γ ϕ
   (38)
where the domestic output   0 .> = 





+
= const
r
y
β
α
δ
α
. 
Formally, under our assumptions there is no guar-
antee that the steady-state consumption will be 
positive. Hence, (38) needs to be examined more 
closely. Notice that the first of the three condi-
tions for stability (27) is equivalent to the following: 
0 ) ( ) ( > − − + − + σ δ  ψ γ σ ϕ n r r n . Therefore, the de-
nominator of the ratio in (38) is positive. Meanwhile, 
the numerator in (38) is positive if and only if  β τ < . 
The empirical estimates of β are usually approximately 
2/3 (Balistreri et al., 2003; Konishi & Nishiyama, 2002; 
Willman, 2002). The level of taxation (at least in the 
OECD countries) only rarely approaches such a high 
level (though in some countries it is permanently 
above 50%). Hence, it seems fair (at least on empirical 
grounds) to assume that
 
β τ <    (39)
This assumption, along with all the others that were 
previously made, ensures positive consumption in the 
DE. The above can also be interpreted in the following 
(slightly perverse) way: if the government in a small 12 Michał Konopczyński
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economy under a monetary union raises the taxation 
too much (above β), then the private consumption will 
shrink to zero. 
The optimal fiscal policy
In this section, we will search for the golden rules for 
fiscal policy, i.e., we will solve the following problem: 
what values of the fiscal parameters guarantee maxi-
mum consumption (per capita) in the DE. It is impor-
tant to remember that the overall consumption consists 
of two elements: privately financed consumption C and 
public expenditures G. Therefore, the optimization cri-
terion is the total consumption per capita in the DE, i.e., 
L G C / ) ( + . Notice that this ratio grows at a constant 
rate σ. Hence, the first (rather intuitive) conclusion is as 
follows: in the DE, the overall consumption grows more 
rapidly with a higher rate of technological progress.
Inasmuch as the technological level A  is exog-
enous, the maximization of consumption per capita 
L G C / ) ( +  is equivalent to the maximization of con-
sumption pel  ( g c + ). Recall that in the DE, both pub-
lic and private consumption pel are fixed according to 
the formula (38) and the following:
y
n
r
g 





+
− + =
σ
ξ
τ ξ ,    where 
β
α
δ
α






+
=
r
y    (40)
First, notice that neither public nor private consump-
tion depends on θ. Therefore, the composition of the 
public debt is of absolutely no importance: it does not 
matter what share of the public debt is actually held by 
foreigners and what share remains in the hands of do-
mestic investors. This conclusion is a straightforward 
implication of the balance identity (19).
Importantly, the steady-state consumption is 
a function of the level of the public deficit (ξ) and the 
rate of taxation (τ ). We examine these functions in 
detail. First, notice that  0 =
∂
∂
ξ
c
, and therefore, private 
consumption in the DE is independent of the level of 
the deficit. However, 
y
n
r g
⋅ 





+
− =
∂
∂
σ ξ
1    (41)
Clearly, three cases can be distinguished:
(a) If  σ + > n r , then the level of the deficit ξ should be 
as low as possible,
(b) If  σ + < n r , then the level of the deficit ξ should be 
as high as possible,
(c) If  σ + = n r , then the steady-state consumption 
per capita is independent of ξ.
Intuitively, in case (a), the cost of the public debt (the 
interest rate) is relatively high; hence, it is not worth-
while to borrow to finance public consumption. The 
exactly opposite situation occurs in case (b). In reality, 
all three of the parameters r, n, and σ may change (and 
r may actually be quite volatile). Thus, all three cases 
may occur in various countries in different periods 
and under varying circumstances. 
Consider the level of taxation τ . It follows from (38) 
that
y
n r r n
n c
⋅
− − + − +
+ − −
=
∂
∂
) ( ) (
) )  ( 1 (
σ δ  ψ γ σ ϕ
σ γ ϕ
τ
   (42)
For any positive values of the parameters that satisfy sta-
bility conditions (27), this partial derivative is negative. 
Hence, the function  ) (τ c  is downward sloping. The 
smaller the redistribution of national income through 
the public sector is, the larger the private consumption 
in the DE is. However, because  0 > =
∂
∂
y
g
τ
, the higher 
the level of taxation is, the larger the public consump-
tion in the DE is. Both of these observations are quite 
obvious. The interesting problem is determining which 
of these effects is stronger. In other words, uncovering 
what the relation of the total consumption in the DE is 
to the level of taxation is very revealing. The above de-
rivatives can be combined into the following equation:
y
n r r n
n r g c
⋅
− − + − +
− ⋅ − −
=
∂
+ ∂
) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ) (
σ δ  ψ γ σ ϕ
ϕ   γ δ  ψ σ
τ
 (43)
If the DE is stable, the denominator of the above ra-
tio is positive. Under this assumption, the sign of the 
partial derivative in (43) is determined by the signs of 
the two expressions in the numerator. Four cases can 
be distinguished (we neglect the special cases in which 
either one or both expressions in the numerator are 
equal to zero): 
(a) If  σ + > n r  and  0 > −ϕ   γ δ  ψ , then the derivative 
in (43) is positive,
(b) If  σ + > n r  and  0 < −ϕ   γ δ  ψ , then the derivative 
in (43) is negative,Vizja Press&IT www.ce.vizja.pl
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(c) If  σ + < n r  and  0 > −ϕ   γ δ  ψ , then the derivative 
in (43) is negative,
(d) If  σ + < n r  and  0 < −ϕ   γ δ  ψ , then the derivative 
in (43) is positive.
Each of these cases is realistic from the empirical point 
of view, and none of them contradicts stability condi-
tions (27). Therefore, the level of taxation should be 
either as high or as low as possible depending on the 
actual characteristics of the economy (i.e., the values of 
the parameters).
In practice, all four of these situations may occur in 
various countries in different periods because of the 
natural variability of the parameters (i.e., the real in-
terest rate r, the savings rate γ, the rate of investment ψ, 
and the natural rate of growth  σ + n ).
To make things simpler and more tangible, notice 
that in real economies the rate of savings γ is usu-
ally close to the rate of investment ψ. In that case, 
0 ) ( ) ( < + − = − ≈ − γ σ γ ϕ δ ϕ   γ δ  ψ n . Hence, in the 
real world cases (b) and (d) will occur much more 
often than the remaining ones. The first of these two 
cases can be interpreted as follows: if the real interest 
rate r exceeds the natural rate of growth, then the level 
of taxation (as well as the public deficit, which was ana-
lyzed above) should be as low as possible to maximize 
the total consumption per capita in equilibrium. The 
opposite statement is true in case (d).
Summary
Introducing explicite the government sector allows for 
some new conclusions, and some of them significantly 
differ from the conclusions that were obtained in the 
simplified model (without government). For example, 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the global 
asymptotic stability of the dynamic equilibrium are 
completely different than in the model without gov-
ernment. These conditions consist of three relatively 
complex inequalities that bind together virtually all the 
exogenous parameters of the economy; only the fiscal 
parameters are not connected thereby. This fact seems 
to be quite interesting, as it implies that the stability of 
an economy depends neither on the taxation rate nor 
on the deficit-to-GDP ratio.
It is relatively easy to come up with a set of param-
eters that violates the stability conditions. Nonethe-
less, we argue that any such set of parameters would 
be unrealistic because at least some of these param-
eters would diverge significantly from their real-world 
counterparts. For this reason, we argue that real-world 
economies easily satisfy the stability conditions. 
Next, we have been seeking the “golden rules” for 
the fiscal policy parameters. Strictly speaking, we 
sought parameter values that maximize the total (pri-
vate plus public) consumption per capita in a dynamic 
equilibrium. The “golden rules” of fiscal policy have 
the form of an alternative optimal policy that crucially 
depends both on the relation between the real interest 
rate and the natural growth rate and on the relations 
between five other independent parameters. Lastly, we 
have demonstrated that in a small open economy in an 
economic and monetary union, it is completely mean-
ingless from the point of view of steady-state wealth 
whether the public debt is financed by domestic or 
foreign investors. 
The model presented in our paper has some strengths 
(as well as weaknesses). First, it is based on very simple 
and general assumptions, and hence, it is very easy to 
analytically describe the state of equilibrium and inves-
tigate its properties. However, it is worth stressing that 
even in our very simple setting, the stability conditions 
are quite complex. Second, the dynamic equilibrium 
is globally asymptotically stable (for a very wide range 
of realistic values of the parameters), which enables 
straightforward applications of numerical methods for 
dynamic simulations of the transitory processes. For 
these two reasons, the model is perfectly suited to edu-
cational purposes. It can also serve as a starting point for 
more complex, applicable models.
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Appendix
By making use of (23) – (26), equations of motion (22) can be rewritten in the following convenient form:
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,  
          (A1)
where  b b − = b ,  D D b b − = D b ,  o o − = o , and  e e − = e are the deviations from the steady state. Let D symbolize 
the square matrix in (A1). Because the dynamics are described by linear system of equations (22), a closer exami-
nation of the properties of the matrix D will provide us with the (necessary and sufficient) conditions of the global 
asymptotic stability of the steady state. Most likely the most convenient method is the Liénard-Chipart theorem 
(Gandolfo, 1980, p. 251). The characteristic equation of matrix D is
0 ) det( 4 3
2
2
3
1
4
0 = + + + + = − w w w w w I D λ λ λ λ λ           (A2)
We define the following determinants:
1 1 w R = ,   
2 3
0 1
2
w w
w w
R = ,   
3 4
1 2 3
0 1
3
0
0
w w
w w w
w w
R = ,   
4
2 3 4
0 1 2 3
0 1
4
0 0 0
0
0 0
w
w w w
w w w w
w w
R =
According to the Liénard-Chipart theorem, the steady state is globally asymptotically stable if and only if the fol-
lowing conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  0 0 > w , (ii)  0 4 > w , (iii)  0 2 > w , (iv)   0 3 > R , (v)   0 1 > R          (A3)
Obviously, (i) is satisfied, as  1 0 = w . It can easily be demonstrated that
[] ) ( ) ( ) ( det
2
4 σ δ  ψ ϕ γ σ σ − − + − + + = = n r r n n D w
Therefore, condition (ii) is satisfied if and only if
) )  ( ( ) ( ϕ δ  ψ σ γ ϕ δ  ψ − + > − n r         (A4)
Inequality (iii) can be transformed to the following form:
[ ] [ ] ) ( 2 ) 1 ( ) ( 3 ) ( 3 ) ( σ ψ δ σ σ γ γ ψ δ + + − + − > + − − n n n r     (A5)
However, after some manipulation  3 R  can be written as follows (the dots stand for very long and complex expressions):
[ ] [ ]
2
3 ... ) 1 ( ) ( 2 ) ( 2 ⋅ − − + − + − = ψ δ σ γ σ n r n R
Hence, condition (iv) can be written in the following equivalent form:
) 1 ( ) ( 2 ψ δ σ γ − + + < n r           (A6)16 Michał Konopczyński
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Furthermore,
) 1 ( ) ( 4 t r 1 ψ δ σ γ − − + − = − = n r D R
Notice that if (A6) is satisfied, then  0 1 > R . Therefore, condition (iv) implies condition (v). 
To summarize, the necessary and sufficient conditions of stability (A3) can be reduced to the following (equivalent) 
system of inequalities:
[] []
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          (A7)